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PROBATE LAW
I. COURT OF APPEALS CONSIDERS JOINT AccouNTS UNDER THE NEw
SOUTH CAROLINA PROBATE CODE AND REAFFIRMS RULE THAT AGENT
MAY NOT MAKE GIFTS TO HIMSELF ABSENT A WRITING EVIDENCING
THE PRINCIPAL'S INTENT
In McCarter v. Willis1 the South Carolina Court of Appeals af-
firmed the well-settled rule in South Carolina that under the provi-
sions in the South Carolina Probate Code2 that concern multiple-party
accounts, particularly joint accounts, agents may not make gifts to
themselves without a writing that shows the principal's intent.3 The
plaintiff in McCarter claimed breach of fiduciary duty and conversion
in the defendant's creation and use of two multiple-party accounts.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court which had granted a di-
rected verdict based solely on a provision in the Probate Code which
states that joint accounts belong to the survivor at death.4
Lois Barker McCarter, personal representative for her father's es-
tate, sued J. Paul Willis, her father's attorney in fact,5 for breach of
fiduciary duty, conversion, and an accounting.6 McCarter claimed that
Willis withdrew money from her father's bank accounts and claimed
that these accounts rightfully belonged to her father's estate and
should have passed under his will.7
Willis managed Barker's financial affairs from 1981 until Barker's
death in 1986. Willis's managerial responsibilities included signatory
authority over Barker's bank accounts and payment authority for
1. 299 S.C. 198, 383 S.E.2d 252 (Ct. App. 1989).
2. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-6-101 (Law. Co-op. 1987). A joint account is "payable on
request to one or more of two or more parties ... whether or not mention iz-made of
any right of survivOrship." Id. § 62-6-101(4).
3. 299 S.C. at 200, 383 S.E.2d at 253.
4. Id., 383 S.E.2d at 253-54.
5. An attorney in fact is:
A private attorney authorized by another to act in his place and stead, either
for some particular purpose, as to do a particular act, or for the transaction
of business in general, not of a legal character. This authority is conferred by
an instrument in writing called a "letter of attorney" or more commonly a
"power of attorney."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 118 (5th ed. 1979).
6. McCarter, 299 S.C. at 199, 383 S.E.2d at 253.
7. See id.
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Barker's expenses." Although Willis and Barker did not reduce their
initial agreement to writing, in 1984 Barker executed a power of attor-
ney in favor of Willis.9
Prior to the execution of the power of attorney, however, Willis
took funds from Barker's bank account and opened joint accounts with
rights of survivorship at First National Bank. These accounts consisted
of two certificates of deposit that Willis and Barker jointly held.10 Wil-
lis cashed one certificate of deposit two days before Barker's death and
deposited the proceeds into a personal account. Willis cashed the sec-
ond certificate of deposit three weeks after Barker's death.1"
When McCarter sued Willis and claimed that the joint accounts
belonged to Barker's estate, Willis relied on the joint accounts provi-
sions of the South Carolina Probate Code1 2 to defend against Mc-
Carter's claim. According to section 62-6-104(a) of the South Carolina
Probate Code "[s]ums remaining on deposit at the death of a party to
a joint account belong to the surviving party or parties as against the
estate of the decedent unless there is a writing filed with the financial
institution . . . which indicates a different intention."13
By enacting section 62-6-104(a) of the South Carolina Probate
Code, the General Assembly adopted section 6-104(e) of the Uniform
robate Code. Section 104(e) provides that "[a] right of survivorship
arising from the express terms of the account . . . cannot be changed
by will."1 4 The South Carolina General Assembly, however, made a sig-
nificant addition to the uniform section: "however, a party who owns
an account under the provisions of § 62-6-103(a) may effect such
change by will to the extent of his ownership if the will contains clear
and convincing evidence of his intent to do so."' 5 Section 62-6-103(a)
8. Id.
9. Id.
1N,0ee id.
11. Id.
12. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-6-101 to -113 (Law. Co-op. 1987 & Supp. 1989).
13. Id. § 62-6-104(a) (Law. Co-op. 1987). Section 62-6-104(0 states that sections
62-6-104(a), (b), and (c) affect transactions made prior to July 1, 1987, with the following
conditions:
The provisions of § 62-6-104(a), (b), and (c) are applicable to all multiple-
party accounts created subsequent to the effective date of this section, [July 1,
1987] and unless there is clear and convincing evidence of a different inten-
tion at the time the account was created, to all multiple-party accounts cre-
ated prior to the effective date of this section.
Id. § 62-6-104(f) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1989). See also id. § 62-1-100(b) (code provisions
apply to multiple-party accounts opened before July, 1, 1987, unless a contrary intent
exists).
14. UNIw. PROBATE CODE § 6-104(e), 8 U.L.A. 526 (1983).
15. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-6-104(e) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
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simply provides that during the lifetime of the parties, the joint ac-
count belongs to each party. according to the net contributions of each
party to the account unless one party can demonstrate a different in-
tent through clear and convincing evidence.16 A party to a joint ac-
count may be able to prevent the operation of the right of survivorship
for that party's net contributions to the joint account if the evidence is
clear and convincing in the will.
Under prior South Carolina law, the courts recognized a rebuttable
presumption that the parties to a joint account with rights of survivor-
ship intended the survivor to obtain full ownership of the account.", In
Johnson v. Herrin"5 the South Carolina Supreme Court stated that the
presumption of a gift to the survivor of a joint account owner
originated in a statute which the legislature enacted to protect finan-
cial institutions.1 9 The court asserted, however, that "this presumption
may be rebutted by evidence which would negate the donative inten-
tion of the deceased.
20
Although South Carolina courts created this rebuttable presump-
tion to determine the intent of the parties when the parties have cre-
ated joint accounts with rights of survivorsliip, the South Carolina Pro-
bate Code states that the parties cannot change this presumption of
survivor ownership by will unless clear and convincing evidence shows
otherwise.21 Even then, the testator can change the presumption only
to the extent of the testator's net contributions to the account.22 Thus,
an examination of circumstances surrounding the creation of the joint
account and the will, as in the Herrin case, would probably not occur
today since section 62-6-104(e) requires clear and convincing evidence
to defeat the presumption of survivor ownership.
The trial court in McCarter recognized that Barker's will did not
contain clear and convincing evidence, which section 62-6-104(e) re-
16. Id. § 62-6-103(a).
17.'See Carolina Prods. dredit Ass'n v. Rogers, 282 S.C. 184, 187, 318 S.E.2d 357,
358 (1984) (factors listed to consider in analysis of rebuttable presumption that funds
from joint account become payable to survivor); Gilford v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank,
257 S.C. 374, 382, 186 S.E.2d 258, 262 (1972) (heirs failed to rebut presumption of intent
of survivor ownership when account card contained the signatures of both parties).
18. 272 S.C. 224, 250 S.E.2d 334 (1978).
19. See id. at 227-28, 250 S.E.2d at 336 (discussing S.C. CODE ANN. § 34-11-10
(Law. Co-op. 1976)).
20. Id. at 228, 250 S.E.2d at 336; see also, Medlin, Selected Substantive Provisions
of the South Carolina Probate Code: A Comparison with Previous South Carolina Law,
38 S.C.L. REv. 611, 665-70 (1987) (analysis of multiple-party accounts under the South
Carolina Probate Code).
21. S.C. CODE ANN. § 62-6-104(e) (Law. Co-op. 1987).
22. Id.
1990]
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quires, and directed a verdict for Willis based solely upon this issue.23
The court of appeals, however, recognized that the central issues in
this case were breach of fiduciary duty and conversion, issues that the
trial court did not address.
2'
Willis agreed in trial testimony that Barker had entrusted him
with Barker's accounts so that Willis would manage Barker's affairs.
Willis admitted that the power of attorney formalized their relation-
ship. 25 Under South Carolina agency law, this type of property entrust-
ment creates a fiduciary relationship, and the agent becomes liable for
conversion if the agent uses the property for the agent's own purpose.28
An agent's abililty to make a gift to himself is well established in
South Carolina law. In Fender v. Fender2 7 the South Carolina Supreme
Court adopted the "rule barring a gift by an attorney in fact to himself
or a third party absent clear intent to the contrary evidenced in writ-
ing."' 28 Moreover, the court held that "oral authorization [is] ineffective
. . . [and] [t]he power to make any gift must be expressly granted in
the instrument itself. '29 In Loftis v. Eck"° the South Carolina Court of
Appeals reaffirmed the rule that "[a]n agent acting for a principal pur-
suant to a power of attorney may not make a substantially gratuitous
conveyance of the property of the principal to himself unless the power
to do so is expressly granted by the instrument itself."31
McCarter claimed that Willis had no written authorization for his
actions and, therefore, breached a fiduciary duty to Barker when Willis
opened the joint accounts. In addition she asserted that Willis con-
verted Barker's funds when he later cashed the certificates of deposit,
and that Willis also wrongfully converted Barker's television. In his de-
fense, Willis stated that he acted on Barker's direction when he opened
the joint accounts, cashed the first certificate of deposit in order to pay
Barker's expenses, and received the television set as a gift for his wife
from Barker.32
Because the trial court did not consider evidence on the breach of
fiduciary duty and conversion claims, the court of appeals determined
that the trial court erred in directing a verdict for Willis when evidence
23. McCarter, 299 S.C. at 199-200, 383 S.E.2d at 253.
24. Id., 383 S.E.2d at 253-54.
25. Id. at 199, 383 S.E.2d at 253.
26. See, e.g., International Agric. Corp. v. Lockhart Power Co., 181 S.C. 501, 506,
188 S.E. 243, 246 (1936) (entrustment of property to a fiduciary for a purpose).
27. 285 S.C. 260, 329 S.E.2d 430 (1985).
28. Id. at 262, 329 S.E.2d at 431.
29. Id.
30. 288 S.C. 154, 341 S.E.2d 641 (Ct. App. 1986).
31. Id. at 157, 341 S.E.2d at 642.
32. McCarter, 299 S.C. at 199-200, 383 S.E.2d at 253-54.
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existed to support McCarter's causes of action. 3 In remanding the case
to the trial court, the court of appeals emphasized South Carolina's
strict view of a fiduciary's standard of behavior adopted by the South
Carolina courts from Justice Cardozo's opinion in Meinhard v.
Salmon:34 "[a] trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of
the market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the
most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior.""
The trial court ruled solely on the provisions of the, South Carolina
Probate Code concerning joint accounts with rights of survivorship.
The court of appeals found that the basis of the claims between the
two parties centered upon the fiduciary duties of an attorney in fact to
the principal. The trial court ignored these issues in favor of a strict
statutory interpretation of a non-testamentary transfer.
Although the trial court's examination of the effect of a will provi-
sion on the joint account provisions of section 62-6-104(e) of the South
Carolina Probate Code proved interesting, the court of appeals recog-
nized the essential issues in the case, applied well-established South
Carolina law which forbids gifts to agents without written authoriza-
tion, and remanded the case for a decision based on these issues.
Christie Newman Barrett
33. Id. at 200, 383 S.E.2d at 254.
34. 249 N.Y. 458, 164 N.E. 545 (1928).
35. Id. at 464, 164 N.E. at 546 (quoted in McCarter, 299 S.C. at 200, 383 S.E.2d at
253).
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